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Executive Perks: Compensation and Corporate Performance in China 
 
Abstract 
Many studies have examined CEO compensation in developed countries, where a long 
tradition of disclosure makes data readily available. In emerging markets, particularly in 
transitioning ones like China, where market-based compensation is a relatively new 
phenomenon, studies of CEO compensation are scarce. What’s more, information on the use 
of non-cash compensation is almost absent. Building on the extant literature of CEO 
compensation, in general, and Chinese economic and management studies, this article 
singularly contributes to the extant literature by (1) examining the financial determinants of 
CEO perk compensation, on the one hand, and (2) exploring the relative contribution of perks 
to performance.  We find that perks are positively associated with current and future return on 
assets, supporting the view that some types of perks may improve the firm’s profitability and 
that perks are paid as a bonus to reward performance. In addition, we find that perk 
compensation is also influenced by firm size, growth opportunity, and leverage.  
 
  
 
Keywords: Executive Compensation, Perks, Non-cash Compensation, Perquisites, Firm 
Performance 
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Introduction 
CEO compensation in China is a new subject of study. Prior to the start of China’s 
reforms in 1977, the economy has relied on the vestiges of Maoism whose tenets of 
communism dictated similar pay for members of society of all ranks. Even then, however, 
high ranking officials and powerful elites benefited from preferential treatment and sundry 
perquisites (McGregor, 2005).  One of the key elements of economic liberalization has been 
the modernization of economic rules and the corporatization of State Owned Enterprises 
(SOE). Listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen were increasingly accountable to 
shareholder, not just the State, and incentives to induce managers to increase profits and the 
value of the business were promulgated. The marketization of the Chinese economy 
necessitated some legal reform by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), 
which was modeled after the US and Hong Kong, corporate governance, and CEO 
compensation schemes (Firth, Fung & Rui, 2006).   
Despite rapid economic reform, socio-economic and political elements of the past 
remained. State ownership of listed companies is still a reality, and the State/local 
government owners of these companies may exercise operational and strategic control. 
Peculiarities of compensation systems are often affected by local customs, traditions, and 
institutions (both formal and informal). State ownership and government involvement is 
another institutional factor. In some Chinese SOEs, executive performance evaluation and 
promotion decision are based mainly on whether the managers can satisfy and act in the 
interest of the Chinese Communist Party and the state (Firth et al., 2006). While political 
advancement is sometimes the main motivator, cash incentive pay for top management is also 
used (Kato & Long, 2005). Another type of publicly traded firms in China is family-
controlled firm. Previous studies (e.g., Kato & Long, 2005) found that cash incentive pay is 
also used in a family controlled firm.    
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Non-cash compensation, including perquisites such as the use of entertainment, 
dining, cars, travel, drinks and karaoke bars and so forth, has not been well studied in the 
Chinese context.  In the Western context, the compensation literature is inconclusive about 
the impact of such compensation. Some, like Jensen and Meckling (1976), regard it as an 
agency cost deleterious to the performance of the firm. Others pointed out several benefits to 
perks compensation, including tax saving, cost saving, productivity and reduction in disutility 
from work (Dale-Olsen, 2007; Long & Scott, 1982; Oyer, 2004; Rajan & Wulf, 2006; Rosen, 
2000). This article adds additional evidence to the growing literature on the impact of non-
cash compensation by testing the specific case of China. We investigate the question of 
whether perks represent agency costs, which worsen firm performance, or perks are part of 
the optimal compensation contract design so that perk compensation and firm performance 
are positively associated in China.  
We anticipate a positive relationship between perks compensation and firm 
performance in China for two reasons. Firstly, because such perks compensation as meals, 
entertainment, and travel help companies build useful connections (guanxi) with 
governmental officers, business partners, as guanxi is often built and maintained through 
lavish meals, banquets, gift giving, joint entertainment, karaoke clubbing, and trips (Ai, 2006; 
Yeung & Tung, 1996). Guanxi has been acknowledged in the literature as an influential 
factor in doing business in China (Ai, 2006; Alon, 2003; McGregor, 2005). Luo and Chen 
(1997), for example, found that guanxi improved sales performance. Since perk expenditures 
are paid not only as part of executive non-cash compensation but also to build and maintain 
connections, we anticipate that perks help improve firm performance. Secondly, the agency 
literature suggests that compensation should be linked to performance to deter shirking 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). In addition to cash, perks may be also paid as a bonus to reward 
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performance. Therefore, we anticipate that perk compensation increases with firm 
performance.  
Few studies empirically examined CEO cash compensation in China, and its 
relationship to firm performance (few exceptions, Firth et al., 2006; Kato & Long, 2005). 
Firth et al. (2006) suggested that understanding the optimal CEO compensation is critical to 
the success of economic reform in China. The authors found pay sensitivities to performance 
are small, and that type of ownership matters. To our knowledge, no study to date examined 
the relative influence of perk compensation on firm performance.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 reviews the background on 
Chinese CEO compensation, provides the theoretical overview of perk compensation, and 
develops our research hypotheses. Section 2 shows the research methods and sample data 
used in this study, including the models that we test along with measures, sample and 
descriptive statistics. Section 3 displays the empirical findings of the models developed in the 
previous section. Section 4 discusses the research findings, and section 5 discusses its 
limitation and provides some guidance for future research. 
 
1. Background on Chinese CEO Compensation and Hypotheses 
Brief History of Chinese Compensation System 
Studies on compensation in China are relatively few and recent. The scarcity of 
literature can be attributed partly to the historical context of compensation in planned 
economies, where regulation overcame market principles in setting wages. Before 1980, 
Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were marked by centralized planning where 
managers were responsible for meeting the target outputs. All the outputs were sold to the 
government (Mengistae & Xu, 2004). Compensation was determined centrally and was not 
based on performance (Chow, 1992). The components of compensation included cash 
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compensation, social wages, and non-material incentives (recognition and honors) (Chow, 
1992). Cash wages were paid based on region, industry, and employee’s characteristics such 
as seniority, tenure, education, gender, and job title (Bai & Xu, 2005; Kato & Long, 2005). 
Cash bonuses were divided equally among group members, which made it more similar to 
supplement wages rather than real bonuses (Chow 1992). Social wages included pension/ 
retirement benefits, insurance for illness, injuries, accidents, disabilities, and unemployment, 
maternity benefits, medical benefits, and collective benefits (such as subsidized 
accommodation, transportation, child-care, and recreational activities) (Chow, 1992). 
During the 1980s, sweeping changes in the regulatory environment have ushered a 
new era of more liberalized compensation schemes. The Chinese government implemented 
several reforms to modernize the executive compensation practices (Mengistae and Xu, 2004). 
The first-phase reform introduced various profit retention schemes between 1980 and 1984. 
An output target was replaced by an output quota, which was below the full production 
capacity. The output in excess of the specified quota could be sold to the market, and firms 
could retain a portion of the profit.  
The second-phase reform which started at the end of 1984 replaced profit remittance 
with a profit tax rate of 55%. The after-tax profit could be used for investment, R&D, and/or 
for bonuses and benefits for employees. Directors were empowered, especially in personnel 
decisions.  In the next phase, Contractual Responsibility Systems (CRSs) was implemented. 
Centralized planning was replaced by contracts between SOEs and their supervising bodies. 
The contracts usually lasted for three to four years. The contracts characterized minimum 
profitability, productivity standards, and investment levels. By signing the contract, the 
directors were personally responsible. Often, directors’ personal wealth was held as 
performance bonds. Because of this risk, directors’ compensation can be up to 10 times of an 
average worker’s compensation.   
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According to Firth et al. (2006), after the economic reform, boards of directors 
determine management compensation, based on the recommendation of the controlling 
shareholder. Due to the socialist environment, there seems to be a cap on management 
compensation as a multiple of average worker’s pay. Previous studies found executive 
compensation to range from three times of that of an unskilled worker to seven times that of 
an average worker. Stock options are rarely used. There was concern about under-
compensation since the managers’ salaries were on average only a fraction of those working 
in international joint ventures.  
As for the history of non-cash compensation in China, we find that the literature on 
non-cash compensation in the Chinese context is almost absent. In 2004, Kato and Long 
(2005) interviewed Chinese executives and found that the most common perks were company 
car and housing allowance. Other perks (the value of which was usually much smaller than 
the two aforementioned) include travel expenses, business gifts, and business apparel 
expenses. Work-related perks such as entertainment expenditures were not included in the 
study. The housing allowance was around 5 – 6% of annual cash salary. Kato and Long (2005) 
estimated the value of personal use of company car to be around 12% of cash compensation. 
Overall, perks ranged from 15% to 32% of the total compensation in China. As for non-cash 
compensation in Hong Kong-owned or foreign-owned firms in China, Chiu, Luk, and Tang 
(2002) found that the most common non-cash compensation provided for employees of all 
levels included subsidized meals, accommodation, holiday or entertainment facilities, annual 
leave, paid sick leave, paid maternity leave, paid wedding leave, paid compassionate leave, 
accident insurance, and health insurance. Different allowances (e.g. overtime allowance, 
sickness allowance, transportation allowance) were also paid. 
 
Theoretical Overview: Perk Compensation in China 
 8
In the classic agency literature, originating in developed countries, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) considered executive perquisite as an agency cost. A manager only owns a 
fraction of a firm. Therefore, expenditures on perk consumption are borne by all the 
shareholders but the benefits are enjoyed mostly only by the manager. The manager thus 
tends to consume too much. Implicitly assumed here is that managers’ cash compensation is 
independent of perk consumption, and it is costly to monitor perk consumption.  
In opposition to Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama (1980) argued that manager’s 
wage can be adjusted, ex ante or ex post, to account for manager’s consumption of perks so 
that perks can be part of the optimal contract, rather than agency costs. Fama (1980)’s view is 
consistent with the prior literature in labor and macro-economics, which discusses the various 
benefits of non-cash compensation: (i) an economy of scale from providing the non-cash 
compensation to a large number of employees, (ii) tax benefits, (iii) productivity - the 
beneficial effects of consumption of the good on production, or the reduction in  the 
employee’s disutility from work (Dale-Olsen, 2007; Long & Scott, 1982; Oyer, 2004; Rajan 
& Wulf, 2006; Rosen, 2000). In this paper, we focus on productivity of non-cash 
compensation.  
One example of a perquisite that can has either a productive or a non-productive 
impact is a corporate jet. On the one hand, a private jet is considered luxurious perquisite for 
a CEO. On the other hand, traveling by a private jet helps the CEO reach the destination fresh 
and ready for the negotiation or other important jobs. Marino and Zábojník (2006) and 
Adithipyangkul (2007) characterize the optimal compensation contract as one that includes 
both perk and cash compensation. A firm which pays in terms of productive non-cash 
compensation will pay less in terms of cash and will also use less cash incentive to motivate 
the manager (Adithipyangkul, 2007). The higher the productivity of the non-cash 
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compensation, the greater the non-cash compensation paid (Adithipyangkul, 2007; Marino & 
Zábojník, 2006). Productive perks improve expected firm performance.  
In addition to being paid as part of the fixed payment, perks may be paid as a bonus to 
reward performance and hence to motivate employees. In this case, because perks and cash 
are substitutes, cash bonus may be reduced accordingly and one may observe a positive 
relationship between perks and firm performance.  
Empirical research in western countries provides inconclusive evidence as to whether 
executive perks represent agency costs or the optimal contract design. Yermack (2006) 
analyzed the data on US CEO’s personal use of a company airplane and found negative 
relationship between perks and stock performance, supporting Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) 
argument that perks represent agency costs. Rajan and Wulf (2006), however, support Fama’s 
(1980) view.  They found that in the US context, perks may be paid because they facilitate 
and enhance CEO’s work. The authors argued that a company airplane tends to be more 
productive when the company’s headquarters are located in a county with a smaller 
population, or in a location remote from a large, convenient airport, and when the firms’ 
operations are more geographically dispersed. For employees at lower levels, evidence is also 
mixed whether non-cash compensation or fringe benefits improve performance. For instance, 
evidence is mixed whether flexible working hours improve worker productivity (Pierce & 
Newstrom, 1980).  
 The Chinese work environment is encumbered by both market and non-market 
elements with unique institutional features, providing a laboratory for testing the agency 
theory prediction on perks in a new context.  One such feature affecting perks consumption is 
the use of guanxi in building business relations (Alon, 2003). Guanxi or connections with 
governmental officers and business partners are crucial for long-term business success in 
China and guanxi is often built through lavish meals, trips, and gift giving (Ai, 2006; Luo & 
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Chen, 1997; Yeung & Tung, 1996). Expenditures on entertainment, meal, travel, and 
communication hence serve two purposes in Chinese firms. On the one hand, such perks are 
consumed by managers, and hence considered part of the total compensation of the managers. 
On the other hands, these expenditures help to build and maintain guanxi, which will lead to 
both short-term and long-term profitability.  
 Furthermore, agency literature prescribes the use of incentive pay to deter shirking 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Bonuses can be paid in cash or in kind. In the optimal contract design, 
perks can be paid as a bonus to reward performance, which may result in a positive 
association between perks and firm performance. On this basis, we theorize two interrelated 
hypotheses between perks and performance: 
 Hypothesis 1a: Perk compensation is positively associated with current firm 
performance in China. 
Hypothesis 2a: Perk compensation is positively associated with future firm 
performance in China. 
Another important Chinese feature which affects compensation practice is firm 
ownership structure. Note that in a communist society, social equity is an issue. Large 
executive compensation may attract criticism. As a result, SOEs are predicted to pay less cash 
compensation. This hypothesis was supported in the previous studies of compensation, e.g., 
Firth, Fung, and Rui (2007). While SOEs were found to pay less cash compensation, the 
relationship between perks and state ownership can be more subtle. On the one hand, because 
of the social equity issue, SOEs may pay less in terms of cash but more in terms of perks, 
which is less observable to the public than cash. On the other hand, in Chinese context, perks 
such as entertainment and meals are also used to build and maintain guanxi. Non-SOEs are 
endowed with less political and governmental connections. It is, thus, reasonable to surmise 
that non-SOEs may need to spend more on guanxi-related expenditures than SOEs. 
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Therefore, whether perks are paid more in SOEs or not remains inconclusive. We test the 
following hypothesis in section 3. 
Hypothesis 3a: Ceteris paribus, the level of perk compensation in state-owned 
enterprises is lower than in non-state-owned enterprises.  
 In addition to the test variables above, we include in the regression analysis other firm 
characteristics (control variables) which were found to determine cash compensation in China. 
These variables include firm size, growth opportunity, and leverage. 
 
A Benchmark: Cash Compensation in China 
In addition to the analysis based on perks, we investigate the relationship between 
cash compensation and firm performance as a benchmark for comparison. Agency theory 
suggests firms to link pay to performance to motivate managers (Eisenhardt, 1989). The 
performance measures used should be informative about all aspects of CEO’s actions which 
contribute to the firm’s short-term and long-term success (Chirstensen & Feltham, 2005). 
Since the data on the actual performance measures used in Chinese companies are not readily 
available, current or lagged accounting numbers and stock performance are often used as 
proxies for the actual performance measures. Consistent with the suggestion to use incentive 
pay to solve agency problems, cash compensation level in China was found to be increasing 
in return on sales (profit/sales) (Mengistae & Xu, 2004), (lagged) return on asset (Conyon & 
He, 2008; Firth at al. 2007; Li, Moshirian, Nguyen & Tan, 2007), and (lagged) stock return 
(Conyon & He, 2008). Note that accounting numbers are based on history and may be short-
term oriented. They may not capture the CEO’s actions which contribute to business success 
in the long run. Researchers thus use future firm performance as a proxy for the performance 
measure which is long-term oriented. Using the U.S. data, Hayes and Schaefer (2000) found 
that future performance can be explained by current CEO compensation.  
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It should be noted here that the relationship between pay and performance may be 
more complicated in China than in other developed economies. There are two types of firms 
in China: SOEs and family-controlled enterprises. For family-controlled firms, managers are 
often the members of the owning families so that ownership and control are not separated and 
much incentive may not be needed to deter managerial shirking. For SOEs, the state has an 
alternative tool to motivate managers, i.e., political advancement, so that the state may not 
need to strongly link pay to performance. In short, Chinese firms may not need to use much 
incentive pay to solve the agency problems between the principal and the agent. However, in 
addition to the moral hazard problems where the principal and the agent’s interests are not 
aligned, another type of agency problems called the principal-principal agency problems 
exists in China. The principal-principal agency problems arise when the majority 
shareholders’ (the state’s or the controlling family’s) interests are not aligned with the 
minority shareholders’ interests (Young, Peng, Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2002). For instance, the 
state may not allow an employee layoff, even when the layoff is beneficial, because it wants 
to control the unemployment rate.  
After the compensation reform, executive pay has been linked to performance. 
Researchers (e.g., Firth et al., 2007) generally argued that pay for performance is there to 
solve the moral hazard problems between the principal (owner) and the agent (manager). 
However, pay for performance can also help to solve the principal-principal agency problems. 
For SOEs, where the state may be more concerned about other goals than profit maximization 
and political advancement is used to motivate managers to fulfill those goals, linking pay to 
performance helps to motivate managers to be more concerned about firm performance and 
hence about the minority shareholders. For family controlled firms, linking the manager-
owner’s pay to performance makes asset misappropriate more costly to the manager because 
by ‘stealing’ from the company, the manager receives less compensation. Base on the agency 
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theory predictions above, we anticipate that cash compensation is positively associated with 
firm current and future performance: 
Hypothesis 1b: Cash compensation is positively associated with current firm 
performance in China. 
Hypothesis 2b: Cash compensation positively associated with future firm 
performance in China. 
 In addition to performance, we anticipate that ownership structure affects cash 
compensation in China. Due to social equity pressures, SOEs are expected to pay less cash 
compensation, possibly to avoid criticism from the public (Conyon & He, 2008; Firth et al., 
2006; Firth et al., 2007; Li et al., 2007).  
 Hypothesis 3b: Ceteris paribus, the level of cash compensation in state-owned 
enterprises is lower than that in non-state-owned enterprises. 
The control variables included in our analysis include firm size, growth opportunity, 
and leverage, as suggested by the previous literature. Mengistae and Xu (2004), Firth et al. 
(2006), Firth et al. (2007), Li et al. (2007), and Conyon and He (2008) found that 
compensation level increased with firm size, possibly because larger firms are more complex 
and, hence, require more skills to manage or because they have a larger resource base to 
attract top talent. Growth opportunity was also found to be positively associated with 
executive compensation (Conyon & He, 2008), possibly because a high-growth firm needs a 
more competent manager who deserves higher pay. In addition to shareholder’s monitoring, 
Firth et al. (2007) found that CEO compensation was decreasing in the degree of leverage, 
implying that debt holders’ monitoring reduces CEO compensation. Additionally, we control 
for year of operation and industry effects.  
 
2. Research Methods and Sample Data 
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We run two regression models to test the research question of whether perks represent 
agency costs or the optimal compensation contract design. First, we test whether pay is 
positively associated with current performance, with particular emphasis on perk 
compensation. Secondly, we examine the relationship between compensation and future 
performance of the firm.   
 
Current Compensation and Current Performance 
To test Hypothesis 1a (whether perk compensation is positively associated with 
current performance) and Hypothesis 3a (whether perk compensation is lower in SOEs), we 
follow the literature of executive compensation to run the following model:  
PERKS it (COMPENSATION it ) = α + β1ROA it + β 2 STATE it + β 3LOG _ SALES it
+β 4 LEVERAGE it + β 5 MB it + YEAR + INDUSTRY + ε it
 ,  
1) 
where  
PERKSit is the logarithm of perks for firm i in year t 
COMPENSATIONit is the logarithm of cash compensation paid for top three executives for 
firm i in year t 
ROAit is the return on assets for firm i in year t 
STATEit is indicator for state-owned enterprises, which equals one if the firm is controlled by 
state and zero otherwise. 
LOG_SALESit , the proxy for size, is the logarithm of sales for firm i in year t 
LEVERAGEit is the ratio of total liability to total assets for firm i in year t 
MBit is market-to-book equity ratio for firm i in year t 
YEAR stands for the yearly fixed effect  
INDUSTRY stands for the industrial effect 
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In addition to the test variables, the control variables included in our analysis are firm 
size, leverage, growth opportunity, the year of operation, and industry effects, as suggested 
by the previous literature.  
 
Statistical Methods 
The standard error is clustered by firms with regards to repetition of same firm in the 
analysis. This model is performed in the pooled sample to provide general evidence whether 
perks can be part of an optimal contract in practice. If compensation contracts are designed 
strategically, cash compensation should be reduced to account for perks consumption. Those 
firms, hence, tend to have relatively lower cash payment. We anticipate that perks will 
increase with firm performance in those companies. If compensation is not designed 
strategically, however, cash compensation is not decreased and should remain high, and perks, 
which represent agency costs, may worsen the firm’s performance. To separate a firm which 
is more likely to design the compensation strategically from a firm with agency problems, we 
create four sub-samples stratified by two dimensions, cash compensation and performance, 
leading to 4 separate groups:  
Group 1) firms with lower cash pay and higher performance,  
Group 2) firms with higher cash pay and lower performance,  
Group 3) firms with lower cash pay and lower performance, and  
Group 4) firms with higher cash pay and higher performance.  
Group (1), firms with lower cash pay but higher performance, is likely to represent a 
group of firms which design their compensation contracts strategically. We anticipate a 
positive relationship between perks and firm performance for this group, i.e., β1 is expected 
to be positive.  
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Group (2), firms with higher cash pay and lower performance, tends to represent firms 
with agency problems. The consumption of perks is more likely to be appropriation of private 
benefit by firm management. We anticipate a negative relationship between firm performance 
and perks for this group, i.e., β1 is expected to be negative.  
The compensation is aligned with performance in groups 3) and 4). We, thus, do not 
make any predication over association between perks and performance for these firms. We 
run the model in each subsample to test these propositions.  
 
Current Compensation and Future Performance 
To test the second research question, we run the following model. 
ROAit+ j =α + β1COMPENSATIONit + β2PERKSit + β3ROAit + β4STATEit
+β5LOG_ SALESit + β6LEVERAGEit + β7MBit +YEAR+ INDUSTRY+ εit ,    
2) 
where  
ROAit+j is the return on assets for firm i in year t+j and j equals 1, 2 and 3 alternatively.  
All the remaining variables are defined in the same way as those in model 1) 
As suggested by Hayes and Schaefer (2000), if some unobservable aspects of 
performance are reflected in future performance, and the managers are rewarded based on the 
unobservable performance measures, the current cash compensation is expected to be 
increasing in the future firm performance. In other words, β1 is expected to be positive. In 
addition, if perks are paid as bonuses to reward unobservable aspects of current performance 
which are reflected in future performance, or perks (especially guanxi-related perks) help to 
improve future performance, β2 is expected to be positive. Same as in model 1), the standard 
errors are clustered by firm in the estimation. 
 
 Sample and Data Sources 
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In the footnotes to cash flow statement, the Chinese listed companies are required to 
disclose the cash expenditure over a list of operating items, such as eating and traveling 
expenditure, transportation expenditure, communication expenditure, entertaining 
expenditure, R&D expenditure, advertising expenditure, etc. We manually collected all the 
items disclosed in this notes for all public companies traded in the Chinese stock markets 
from 1999 to 2004. Some of the expenditures listed are partly consumed by managers. 
Company cars and mobile phones, for example, are used both for work and for personal 
transportation and communication. We anticipate that the expenses on eating, traveling, 
company cars, communication, socializing, and entertaining are the expenditures which 
involve personal consumption by management. The sum of these expenditures is denoted by 
PERKS1, which is a proxy for management perquisites. Because we cannot determine the 
extent to which the expenditures is spent for management’s personal consumption, the 
variable PERK1 may not be a good proxy for management perquisites. We, therefore, also 
focus our analysis on the types of perks which seem to involve more of the management’s 
personal consumption, i.e., the expenditures on eating, traveling, and entertaining. The sum 
of these expenditures is denoted as PERKS2.  
As a benchmark for the motivating effect of perks, we also compile the cash 
compensation for the top three executives in the company. The cash compensation data is 
compiled from a database for the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR). 
The market and accounting data are also from CSMAR. The final sample includes 3,706 
firm-year observations with both perks and cash compensation data available. The 
distribution of sample by fiscal year is reported in Panel A of Table 1. The number of firms 
by year increases from 161 in 2000 to 973 in 2004, which indicates the increasing number of 
firms listed in Chinese stock market as well as the improvement in disclosure quality.  The 
distribution of sample by industry is reported in Panel B of Table 1. More than 50% of our 
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sample firms are from manufacturing sector. This is consistent with the industry structure of 
Chinese stock market.  
Insert Table 1 (Panel A & B) About Here 
 
Descriptive statistics  
Table 2 panel A provides the descriptive statistics of perks and cash compensation. 
PERKS1, which includes expenditure on eating, traveling, company car, socializing, 
communication, and entertaining, has a mean and median of 4.73 and 1.39, respectively. 
PERKS2, which includes only eating, traveling and entertaining expenditure, has a mean and 
median amounting to 4.00 and 1.06, each of which is only marginally lower than that of 
PERKS1. This means that the eating, traveling and entertaining expenditures, which help 
managers build and maintain guanxi, are the main components of perks in Chinese firms. 
Compared with perks, cash compensation has a mean and median of 0.42 and 0.30, which are 
much lower than perks consumed in the company. This difference can be attributed to the fact 
that perks are consumed by the whole management team while compensation is confined to 
the top three executives in the company.  
Panel B of Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of firm’s performance, measured 
as return on assets (ROA), and other controlling variables, leverage, size and market-to-book 
equity ratio. Especially, the variable STATE, which is an indicator for state-controlled firms, 
shows that around 79% percent of firms in our sample are controlled by state.  We control for 
this ownership effect in all the models because we anticipate that the compensation structure, 
including perks and compensation, may vary in state- and non-state-controlled firms.  
Insert Table 2 (Panel A & B) About Here 
 
3. Results 
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Our results are divided into two sections: the first relates pay for performance, with emphasis 
on perk compensation, analyzed for different samples, and the second relates to future 
performance of the firm (proxied by ROA) to perk compensation as well as other financial 
variables.   
 
Current Compensation and Current Performance 
Based on agency theory, we predicted that perk and cash compensations are positively 
associated with current firm performance.  
 Hypothesis 1a: Perk compensation is positively associated with current firm 
performance in China. 
 Hypothesis 1b: Cash compensation is positively associated with current firm 
performance in China. 
 Table 3 reports the baseline model of association of perks and cash compensation 
with contemporaneous performance. The coefficient of ROA is 0.019 with a significance 
level at 1% for cash compensation, supporting Hypothesis 1b. This indicates that cash 
compensation is linked to performance in China.  In addition, the coefficients of ROA in 
model (1) and (2) with PERKS1 and PERKS2 as dependent variables are both 0.07, 
significant at 5% level, supporting Hypothesis 1a. The positive association between perks and 
contemporaneous performance indicates that the perks may not simply represent agency costs 
where managers abuse the firm’s resources through overconsumption of perks, as suggested 
by Jensen and Meckling (1976).  In contrast, these findings support Rajan and Wulf (2006) 
and Fama (1980) who proposed a possible positive productive impact of such compensation. 
Insert Table 3 About Here 
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Hypothesis 3a: Ceteris paribus, the level of perk compensation in state-owned 
enterprises is lower than in non-state-owned enterprises.  
Hypothesis 3b: Ceteris paribus, the level of cash compensation in state-owned 
enterprises is lower than in non-state-owned enterprises.  
The STATE variable, an indicator for state-controlled firms, is significantly negative 
in model (3), which means the formal cash compensation in state-controlled firms is lower 
than that in non-state-controlled firms. This is consistent with the literature (e.g., Li et al., 
2007) and with Hypothesis 3b. Cash compensation is regulated in state-controlled firms. 
Social equity pressures possibly limits the amount of cash compensation SOEs can award to 
the managers. The STATE variable, however, is not significantly associated with perks, as 
predicted by Hypothesis 3a.  
The coefficients of the remaining controlling variables are consistent with the findings 
in the previous studies. The large and growing firms are more likely to pay higher cash 
compensation and perks to management while highly leveraged firms will pay less. The 
association of perks with firm’s fundamentals is the same as that of cash compensation. This 
provides evidence that perks and cash may be substitutes.   
An alternative explanation for a positive association between perks and performance 
may be that self-interested managers can misappropriate shareholders’ wealth through perks 
(and possibly also through cash compensation) only when the performance is good and there 
are excess resources to expropriate. To provide further evidence that perks can be part of the 
optimal contract, rather than agency costs, we perform the pay-for-performance analysis in 
sub-samples stratified by level of cash compensation and firm performance. The sample is 
stratified into two sub-samples of firms with higher or lower pay, with the median of average 
cash compensation as cutoff a point. And the sample is also stratified into two sub-samples of 
firms with higher or lower performance, with the median of average ROA as a cutoff point. 
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The crossover of the above two stratifications generates results for the four groups discussed 
earlier (see Table 4). 
Insert Table 4 About Here 
 
Group (1) includes firms with lower cash compensation, but higher performance. This 
group is likely to represent a group of firms which design their compensation optimally. Non-
cash compensation is expected to be paid to enhance the firm profitability and as a substitute 
for cash bonus to motivate performance. We proposed a positive relationship between perks 
and firm performance for this group. Group (2) includes firms with higher cash but lower 
performance. This group seems to represent firms with agency problems. We anticipate a 
negative relationship between perks and firm performance. The test results of the above two 
predictions are reported in Panel A of Table 4. Consistent with the stratification criteria of 
sub-sample, the association of cash compensation with performance becomes much weaker 
than that in pooled sample analysis. The formal cash compensation does not have much 
motivating effect in these two sub-samples. However, the association of perks with 
performance becomes much stronger among firms with higher performance and lower pay in 
Group (1). The coefficient of ROA with PERKS (PERKS2) as dependent variable increases 
from 0.070 (0.071) in Table 3 to 0.354 (0.403) (see model (1) and model (2) in Panel A of 
Table 4). The relationships are statistically significant. The association of perks with 
performance becomes much weaker among firms with lower performance but higher pay in 
Group (2). The coefficient of ROA with PERKS1 (PERKS2) as dependent variable decreases 
from 0.070 (0.071) in Table 3 to -0.08 (-0.068) (see model (4) and model (5) in Panel A of 
Table 4). The relationships for Group (2) become negative as predicted, but insignificant. 
This is possible because some of the perk-related expenditure may have been spent 
productively to build guanxi, which helps improve firm performance. The rest of the 
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expenditures, which may be the misappropriation by management, worsened performance. 
The two opposing forces possibly result in insignificant relationships between perks and 
performance.  
The evidence from Panel A of Table 4 suggests that the two kinds of firms seem to 
coexist in the market, those with well aligned compensation schemes (as represented by 
Group 1), and those which are inflicted by agency problems (as represented by Group 2). 
Perks compensation, when well implemented, can lead to the optimal and motivating 
compensation. Said another way, non-cash compensation, if used appropriately, can both 
enhance profitability and be paid to motivate managers.  
The empirical evidence of the association between perks and compensation with 
performance for firms in group (3) and (4) is provided in Panel B of Table 4 as a benchmark 
reference. These are firms with higher performance and higher pay or firms with lower 
performance and lower pay (pay and performance is tied). The association of cash 
compensation with firm performance becomes stronger for Group (4). But, we did not find 
any significant association between perks and firm performance.  
 
Current Compensation and Future Performance 
Hypothesis 2a: Perk compensation is positively associated with future firm 
performance in China.  
Hypothesis 2b: Cash compensation is positively associated with future firm 
performance in China. 
Since expenditures on entertainment, meal, travel, and communication can help to 
build and maintain guanxi, which is vital for long-term success, perks are anticipated to lead 
to better future performance. Additionally, as suggested by the agency literature, we also 
anticipate that current cash compensation is positively associated with future firm 
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performance (a proxy for long-term oriented performance measure). Our study supports these 
propositions, as shown in Table 5.  
Insert Table 5 About Here 
 
The coefficients for COMPENSATION and PERKS are positive and significant, as 
predicted by Hypotheses 2a and 2b. For up to three year, the future performance increases 
with current cash compensation and perks. In addition to confirming the findings by Hayes 
and Schaefer (2000) as to cash compensation, we also find that perks seem to be used as 
bonuses to reward long-term performance and that these perks may improve future firm 
performance. 
 
4. Discussion  
As suggested by the agency theory, much of the previous compensation literature 
considers the relationships between cash compensation and performance. Some of the 
previous studies in Western countries examined the relationships between perks and 
performance and found inconclusive evidence whether perks represent agency costs or 
optimal compensation contract design. To the best of our knowledge, no previous study 
considers this research question in the Chinese context. This study investigates whether 
Chinese managers steal from their companies through excessive perk consumption or perks 
are provided for good reasons, such as to motivate managers and increase performance. 
Contrary to evidence from Western countries (e.g., Pfeffer and Sutton, 2006), our research 
suggests that perks are an important form of compensation in China, both because they may 
be an instrument for developing business through guanxi development (which often involves 
entertaining) and because they act as motivators for managers. The research also implies that 
investment in guanxi (through perks) brings long-term benefits, as the firm future 
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performance is found to be increasing in current perks. The top executives in Chinese 
companies, on average, spend about 4-5RMB million per year, in contrast to their pay which 
ranges about 0.42RMB million per year.  
In addition to perks, the research investigates the relationships between cash 
compensation and current and future performance for comparison. Similar to perks, cash 
compensation is found to be positively associated with current and future performance, 
suggesting that cash and perks may be used as substitutes for rewarding managers’ future 
performance. 
Furthermore, we anticipate that Chinese SOE may use perks to compensate their 
managers competitively. Since they may be limited in what they can give in the form of cash 
compensation (because of either regulation or institutional pressure), perks provide the firm 
with the ability to “hide” the total compensation package in more opaque forms of 
compensation which are harder to track and criticize. The research finds that state ownership 
has a negative and significant impact on cash compensation, as found in the previous studies. 
However, state ownership does not have a significant impact on perk compensation, possibly 
because on the one hand, a SOE faces more serious social equity cash compensation 
pressures, and therefore it pays more in terms of perks since perks are more opaque to the 
public. On the other hand, non-SOE may spend more on perks due to greater needs to build 
and maintain guanxi with politicians and government officers, as well as with suppliers and 
buyers.  
Large companies with high sales volume are more likely to give both higher cash 
compensation and higher perk compensation, and leverage has a negative and significant 
impact on both cash compensation and perks compensation, but the impact on cash 
compensation is more than 5 times larger.  This suggests that companies in China whose ratio 
of total liability to total assets are larger are less likely to afford perks than they are able to 
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afford cash compensation. In contrast, the coefficient of market-to-book equity ratio (which 
measures the future potential) is positive and significant for both cash compensation and 
perks, but the relative impact on perks is much larger (more than 8 times larger for PERKS 
1).   
The stratified subsamples in our data indicate that some firms may align perks 
compensation incentive better than others and, those that do, exhibit a strong relationship 
between ROA and perks compensation. Perks in low performing, high paying firms are not 
related to any of our financial variables. Perks are significantly and positively related to sales 
and MTB in lower performing, lower paying firms. In contrast, perks are only related to MTB 
in higher performance and higher cash payout firms.   
 
5. Limitation and Future Research 
More research is needed on non-cash compensation in China. We provide a first 
empirical outlook into this important feature of compensation reform. But data are still 
lacking.  For example, when data become available on stock options, comparisons with 
Western firms will be useful. Over time, the structure of compensation will change and 
replication work may be needed. In addition, we find that perks are positively associated with 
firm performance and we propose two reasons for this result – (i) perks help to build and 
maintain guanxi and guanxi leads to business success, and (ii) perks are paid as a bonus to 
deter managerial shirking. Because the data on the break-down of perks into the fixed 
compensation component and the bonus component are not publicly available, we cannot 
answer the question to what extent perks are paid as part of fixed compensation to build 
guanxi and to what extent perks are paid as a bonus to deter managerial shirking. Future case-
study or survey research to gather the detailed data on the break-down of perks into two 
components will help us understand the use of perk compensation in China better.  
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 Furthermore, while the compensation literature often examines the use of incentive 
pay to solve the moral hazard problems between the principal and the agent, not much 
previous work considers the use of compensation design to solve the principal-principal 
agency problems. A formal theory is needed for researchers to distinguish the use of 
incentive pay to solve principal-agent agency problems from the use of incentive pay to solve 
the principal-principal agency problems. 
Finally, there is a need to test theories of compensation in relation to the unique 
environment in China and, indeed, other countries in order to develop general explanations 
across different systems. While perks seem to be viewed rather negatively by investors in the 
West and the evidence seems inconclusive as to the effects of perks on firm, the relationship 
between perks, especially guanxi-related perks, and firm performance may be different in 
East Asia where networking is one of the keys to business success. Future studies should 
extend this framework to other countries, in both developing and developed contexts.  
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Table 1 Sample Description 
Panel A: By year  
The panel presents the sample distribution by year.  
 
Year Number 
As Percentage of 
sample 
1999 199 5% 
2000 161 4% 
2001 646 17% 
2002 843 23% 
2003 884 24% 
2004 973 26% 
Total  3,706 100% 
  
 
Panel B: By Industry  
This panel provides the sample distribution by industry.  
 
Industry Number 
As Percentage 
of sample 
Agriculture, Forestry, Animal Husbandry and fishing 72 2% 
Mining 54 1% 
Manufacturing 2127 57% 
Production and distribution of Electricity, Gas and Water 195 5% 
Construction 62 2% 
Transport, Storage and Post 154 4% 
Information transmission, Computer service and software 197 5% 
Wholes and Retail trade 252 7% 
Real Estate 172 5% 
Management of Water Conservancy, environment and 
public facilities 103 3% 
Culture, Sport and entertainment 14 0% 
Conglomerate 304 8% 
Total 3706 100% 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Perks and Compensation 
This table provides the descriptive statistics for level of perks and cash compensation. PERKS1 is defined as the 
summary of expenses on eating, traveling, company cars, communication, socializing, and entertaining in the fiscal 
year. PERKS2 is the defined as the expenses on eating, traveling and entertaining in the fiscal year. 
COMPENSATION is the total cash compensation paid to the top three executive officers in the fiscal year. All the 
variables are measured in one million RMB. 
 
VARIABLE N MEAN MEDIAN STD. DEV. 
PERKS1 3706 4.73 1.39 7.95 
PERKS2 3706 4.00 1.06 6.72 
COMPENSATION 3706 0.42 0.30 0.37 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Panel B: Financial and stock return 
This provides the descriptive statistics for the financial data. ROA, return on assets, is defined as the net income 
divided by total assets at the fiscal year end. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total liability to total assets at the fiscal year 
end. MTB, market-to-book equity ratio, is defined as the ratio of market value to book value of equity at the fiscal 
year end. LOG_SALES is the log of total sales in the fiscal year. STATE, indicator for state-controlled firms, equals 
one if the company is controlled by local or central government and zero if it’s controlled by entrepreneurs.  
 
  N MEAN MEDIAN STD. DEV. 
ROA (%) 3706 2.274 2.854 5.695 
LEVERAGE 3706 0.467 0.469 0.180 
MTB 3706 3.729 2.938 2.533 
LOG_SALES 3706 20.264 20.233 1.175 
STATE 3706 0.793 1.000 0.405 
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Table 3 Association of Perks and Compensation with firm performance 
This table provides the regression results for the association of perks and compensation with firm 
performance. The dependent variable is log of PERKS1 plus one, PERKS2 plus one and 
COMPENSATION plus one respectively in Model (1) to (3). Independent variables includes, 
ROA, return on assets, measured as the net income divided by total assets at the fiscal year end, 
STATE, an indicator variable, taking value of one for state controlled firms, and zero otherwise, 
LEVERAGE, the ratio of total liability to total assets at the fiscal year end, MTB, market-to-book 
equity ratio, measured as the ratio of market value to book value of equity at the fiscal year end, 
LOG_SALES, the logarithm value of total sales in the fiscal year. OLS model with standard error 
clustered by firm is applied. Yearly and industrial fixed effect are controlled but not reported. *, 
**, and *** stand for statistical significance of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
  PERKS1 PERKS2 COMPENSATION 
ROA 0.070 0.071 0.019 
 (2.24)** (2.23)** (5.58)*** 
STATE -0.097 -0.129 -0.175 
 (0.20) (0.26) (3.55)*** 
LOG_SALES 0.364 0.337 0.268 
 (1.79)* (1.66)* (11.88)*** 
LEVERAGE -2.323 -2.224 -0.434 
 (1.79)* (1.73)* (3.23)*** 
MTB 0.191 0.159 0.023 
 (2.08)** (1.72)* (2.22)** 
Constant 1.351 1.973 6.277 
 (0.33) (0.48) (14.33)*** 
Observations 3706 3706 3706 
Adjusted R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.39 
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Table 4 Association of Perks and Compensation with firm performance in sub-samples 
Panel A Firms with performance inconsistent with cash compensation 
This panel presents the regression result of association of perks and compensation with firm performance among firms with higher 
performance and lower compensation and firms with lower performance and higher compensation. Firms with average ROA above the 
median of average ROA of each firm from 1999 to 2004 are regarded as firms with higher performance and firms with lower performance 
otherwise. Firms with average compensation for top three executives above the median of that for each firm from 1999 to 2004 are 
regarded as firms with higher pay and firms with lower pay otherwise. The dependent variable is log of PERKS1 plus one, PERKS2 plus 
one and COMPENSATION plus one respectively in Model (1) to (3) and Model (4) to (6). Independent variables includes, ROA, return on 
assets, measured as the net income divided by total assets at the fiscal year end, STATE, an indicator variable, taking value of one for state 
controlled firms, and zero otherwise, LEVERAGE, the ratio of total liability to total assets at the fiscal year end, MTB, market-to-book 
equity ratio, measured as the ratio of market value to book value of equity at the fiscal year end, LOG_SALES, the logarithm value of total 
sales in the fiscal year. OLS model with standard error clustered by firm is applied. Yearly and industrial fixed effect are controlled but not 
reported.  *, **, and *** stand for statistical significance of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
 Firms with higher performance but lower cash pay Firms with lower performance but higher cash pay 
  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
  PERKS1 PERKS2 COMPENSATION PERKS1 PERKS2 COMPENSATION 
ROA 0.354 0.403 0.019 -0.080 -0.068 0.004 
 (2.45)** (2.86)*** (1.71)* (1.32) (1.11) (1.33) 
STATE 0.365 0.495 0.006 -1.616 -1.641 -0.164 
 (0.28) (0.38) (0.07) (1.49) (1.51) (2.66)*** 
LOG_SALES -0.159 -0.225 0.062 0.190 0.129 0.142 
 (0.30) (0.43) (1.54) (0.42) (0.28) (6.21)*** 
LEVERAGE 1.342 2.505 -0.046 -1.350 -0.285 -0.121 
 (0.41) (0.78) (0.17) (0.41) (0.09) (0.69) 
MTB -0.464 -0.609 0.009 0.047 -0.000 0.008 
 (1.66)* (2.35)** (0.54) (0.23) (0.00) (0.69) 
Constant 13.148 14.044 9.684 3.714 4.893 9.276 
 (1.30) (1.42) (13.30)*** (0.40) (0.53) (21.04)*** 
Observations 755 755 755 756 756 756 
Adjusted R-squared 0.06 0.07 0.35 0.05 0.05 0.37 
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Table 4 Association of Perks and Compensation with firm performance in sub-samples 
Panel B Firms with performance consistent with cash compensation 
This panel presents the regression result of association of perks and compensation with firm performance in motivation aligned firms, 
which are firms with lower performance and lower pay and firms with higher performance and higher pay. Firms with average ROA above 
the median of average ROA of each firm from 1999 to 2004 are regarded as firms with higher performance and firms with lower 
performance otherwise. Firms with average compensation for top three executives above the median of that for each firm from 1999 to 
2004 are regarded as firms with higher pay and firms with lower pay otherwise. The dependent variable is log of PERKS1 plus one, 
PERKS2 plus one and COMPENSATION plus one respectively in Model (1) to (3) and Model (4) to (6). Independent variables includes, 
ROA, return on assets, measured as the net income divided by total assets at the fiscal year end, STATE, an indicator variable, taking value 
of one for state controlled firms, and zero otherwise, LEVERAGE, the ratio of total liability to total assets at the fiscal year end, MTB, 
market-to-book equity ratio, measured as the ratio of market value to book value of equity at the fiscal year end, LOG_SALES, the 
logarithm value of total sales in the fiscal year. OLS model with standard error clustered by firm is applied. Yearly and industrial fixed 
effect are controlled but not reported.  *, **, and *** stand for statistical significance of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
 Firms with lower performance and lower cash pay Firms with higher performance higher cash pay 
  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
  PERKS1 PERKS2 COMPENSATION PERKS1 PERKS2 COMPENSATION 
ROA 0.043 0.039 0.009 0.153 0.148 0.041 
 (1.03) (0.94) (2.43)** (1.21) (1.15) (4.44)*** 
STATE 0.452 0.310 -0.154 0.505 0.499 -0.153 
 (0.56) (0.39) (2.32)** (0.57) (0.57) (2.69)*** 
LOG_SALES 0.942 1.047 0.093 -0.173 -0.248 0.124 
 (2.72)*** (3.05)*** (2.71)*** (0.41) (0.60) (4.94)*** 
LEVERAGE -3.030 -3.320 -0.203 0.061 -1.192 0.125 
 (1.49) (1.65) (1.16) (0.02) (0.39) (0.74) 
MTB 0.287 0.284 0.006 0.541 0.543 -0.021 
 (2.05)** (2.05)** (0.59) (2.36)** (2.38)** (1.55) 
Constant -8.964 -10.806 9.661 8.344 9.930 9.281 
 (1.28) (1.57) (15.00)*** (0.99) (1.20) (19.08)*** 
Observations 1097 1097 1097 1098 1098 1098 
Adjusted R-squared 0.06 0.06 0.37 0.05 0.07 0.41 
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Table 5 Relationships between perks and cash compensation and future performance 
This table shows the relationships between perks and cash compensation and future firm performance. The dependent variable is ROA in 
one, two and three years forward respectively in Model (1) and (2), Model (3) and (4) and Model (5) and (6). The independent variable 
includes, the logarithm value PERKS1t plus one, the logarithm value PERKS2t plus one, the logarithm value COMPENSATIONt plus one, 
ROAt, return on assets, measured as the net income divided by total assets at the end of year t, STATEt, an indicator variable, taking value 
of one for state controlled firms, and zero otherwise, LEVERAGEt, the ratio of total liability to total assets at the end of year t, MTBt, 
market-to-book equity ratio, measured as the ratio of market value to book value of equity at the end of year t, LOG_SALESt, the logarithm 
value of total sales in the year t. OLS model with standard error clustered by firm is applied. Yearly and industrial fixed effect are 
controlled but not reported.  *, **, and *** stand for statistical significance of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
  ROAt+1 ROAt+2 ROAt+3 
  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
COMPENSATIONt 0.388 0.391 0.522 0.524 0.375 0.375 
 (3.28)*** (3.30)*** (3.70)*** (3.71)*** (2.08)** (2.08)** 
PERKS1t 0.030  0.034  0.032  
 (2.78)***  (2.49)**  (1.84)*  
PERKS2t  0.035  0.034  0.029 
  (3.07)***  (2.52)**  (1.68)* 
ROAt 0.421 0.421 0.253 0.253 0.211 0.211 
 (15.88)*** (15.89)*** (9.33)*** (9.33)*** (5.45)*** (5.46)*** 
LOG_SALESt 0.866 0.864 0.845 0.845 0.891 0.893 
 (7.91)*** (7.88)*** (6.85)*** (6.85)*** (5.89)*** (5.90)*** 
LEVERAGEt -4.380 -4.371 -4.862 -4.864 -3.970 -3.980 
 (6.87)*** (6.85)*** (6.42)*** (6.42)*** (3.93)*** (3.93)*** 
MTBt 0.366 0.366 0.286 0.287 0.158 0.160 
 (6.20)*** (6.21)*** (4.28)*** (4.30)*** (2.07)** (2.08)** 
Constant -21.517 -21.564 -24.218 -24.257 -23.805 -23.826 
 (9.63)*** (9.67)*** (9.01)*** (9.02)*** (7.05)*** (7.05)*** 
Observations 3925 3925 3855 3855 2806 2806 
Adjusted R-squared 0.28 0.28 0.17 0.17 0.13 0.13 
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